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Introduction
The President's response to the 9/11 attacks represented a seminal change in America's approach to war. The shift toward preemption as a key tenet of the United States National Security Strategy put the world on notice that this country would not passively await the next asymmetric attack but would seek out and engage enemy forces in anticipatory self-defense.
Although preemption may take many forms (e.g. the targeting of terrorist leaders in Yemen by an armed Predator), military planners will be particularly challenged to design successful fullscale counterterrorist campaigns in the Global War on Terror. The key military objectives in such campaigns, regime change (elimination of the nation-state's existing leadership) and the elimination of the terrorist organization resident in the nation-state, are unlimited in nature.
Moreover, the unlimited national-strategic objective, presented in the moral context of a good versus evil battle, 4 is the eventual elimination of global terrorism in order to make the world a safer place.
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Theoretical literature and joint doctrine does not specifically address preemptive counterterrorist campaigns. Operational planners will need to blend existing literature (both theoretical and doctrinal) with the tenets of operational art to design campaigns supporting a national-strategic objective of freedom from the tyranny of transnational terrorists. The challenge will reside in visualizing an end-state that achieves the leverage necessary to shift the primacy of effort from military to non-military sources of power, and to return security and stabilization responsibilities to the indigenous forces of the nation-state. Effectively, leverage and the desired end-state must be achieved in the post-hostility phase of the campaign so as prevent the emergence of a follow-on regime that could harbor terrorist organizations. As the first campaign 6 in the Global War on Terror, Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan offers insight into the difficulties faced by operational commanders as they strive to win the greater conflict.
War Termination-Theory and Doctrine
Clausewitz articulated the concept that war is simply an extension of politics in another dimension. As such, military action should be undertaken only with a clear understanding of its eventual political goal. 7 In this context, war termination is more aptly described as a process of transitioning from the use of primarily military power back to a renewed focus on the diplomatic, economic, and informational aspects of national power in order to achieve the stated political goal. Military power alone will rarely, if ever, attain this goal by itself. The non-military instruments of national power previously failed to achieve the political goal; as a result national leaders decided to initiate military operations. As an option of last resort, "military power is exerted to control the situation," 8 in order to restore the conditions that will facilitate a return to the other elements of national power. The diplomatic, informational and economic aspects of power do not cease to function during the conflict; rather their influence becomes muted as hostilities commence (but continues nonetheless). necessity, will determine conflict termination and the subsequent transition to post-hostility operations unilaterally.
Post-conflict operations, characterized by security and stabilization efforts, compare favorably with low-intensity conflict. War termination in low-intensity conflict, as a theoretical substitute for post-conflict operations, recognizes that termination will only be achieved by the full spectrum of national power, of which the military is but one element. The success of military transition operations will be "measured in decreasing requests for U.S. assistance" by the host nation's forces. 18 In essence, Killebrew postulates that ground forces engaged in low-intensity conflict will have achieved the desired military end-state when the responsibility for security and stabilization can be returned to host nation forces. 19 The logic of this theoretical approach is applicable for the post-conflict operations ongoing in Afghanistan.
Low-intensity conflict termination theory notwithstanding, the limitations inherent in the rational approach to war termination, both with respect to cost analysis and negotiation, exacerbate the challenges faced by operational planners in the War on Terror. Transnational terrorist organizations, waging a holy jihad in support of fundamentalist ideological beliefs, have not, and will not, act in a rational manner with respect to either a cost-benefit or cost-comparison analysis. Negotiation is not an option with these entities; the United States is essentially engaged in a total war with this foe. Simultaneously, the destruction of regimes that provide safe harbor to these organizations removes any coherent leadership with which to negotiate at the nationstate level. The resulting vacuum in national leadership, if not addressed, will continue to foster the environment which allowed terrorist organizations to flourish initially. Despite the significant increase in doctrinal literature, planners today can still not avail themselves of a coherent, defined process by which to achieve leverage and the desired military end-state. Joint publications clearly stipulate the importance of such items but do not explicitly state how to attain these same conditions. Across the spectrum of conflict, it may simply be too difficult to provide a "checklist" of tasks that will result in the leverage needed to create the Broad emphasis on such principles and concepts may be the best that doctrinal publications can provide to operational staffs. Nevertheless, operational commanders and their staffs should strive to specifically define what "leverage" will be during each phase of the campaign, and to specifically link this leverage to the conditions that must be established to create the desired military end-state supporting, in turn, the long-term political goal.
Operation Enduring Freedom
The Global War on Terror is an ideological struggle with the unlimited national-strategic objective of eliminating the transnational terrorist threat. Within this global conflict, each counterterrorist campaign such as Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan is simultaneously a limited conflict and an unlimited conflict. The limited conflict is with the nation-state itself, specifically the regime in power. The government in question has the option of acquiescing to U.S. demands or facing their imminent removal from power. Once hostilities commence, the military objective is regime change. The unlimited conflict is with the terrorist organization(s) that have established a base of operations within the nation-state. At a minimum, U.S. forces must deny the terrorist organization's ability to operate within the nation-state. Eventually however, U.S. forces must also capture or eliminate both terrorist leadership and terrorist footsoldiers so that they cannot shift their base of operations and continue their asymmetric conflict.
In a conventional military confrontation with either entity, victory is a foregone conclusion.
U.S. military forces have superior training and technology that far outstrip any potential
adversaries, and if applied decisively, will achieve a quick victory during major combat operations. The military campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate this fact
explicitly. Yet, it is eminently possible to win such campaigns in a military sense but to lose the Global War on Terror by failing to achieve the national-strategic objective. The decapitation of a nation-state's leadership creates a civil government vacuum that allows terrorists and bandits to operate at will. Moreover, a country's descent into anarchy could generate the despair that will entice more individuals to join criminal and terrorist organizations. In recognition of this potential, the operational design of a campaign in the Global War on Terror should focus on a military end-state in which the conditions have been created that allow security operations to transfer to indigenous forces. One can infer that these conditions include a measurable level of stability and peace throughout the country, and the creation of a well-trained and appropriatelysized indigenous security force. Planners must thus focus on creating these conditions, in effect achieving the decisive leverage, during post-conflict operations rather than during major combat operations. fall of the remaining northern stronghold, Kunduz (November 24 th ), and the southern stronghold, Kandahar (December 7 th ), soon followed. Within two months of the commencement of hostilities, U.S. Central Command had achieved the first of its military objectives -the removal of the Taliban regime.
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Actions against al Qaeda were also successful, albeit to a lesser degree. Following the fall of the Taliban and concurrent with the installation of a provisional government, U.S. Central
Command continued (and continues) to target terrorist leadership, forces and strongholds in a series of major and minor tactical actions (e.g. Operation Anaconda). U.S. forces achieved a limited objective-the terrorist organization ceased to function within Afghanistan 37 -yet failed to achieve the unlimited strategic objective, namely the elimination or capture of al Qaeda's senior leadership. 38 Over two years after the campaign's start, al Qaeda remnants are regrouping within The operational design of counterterrorist campaigns must focus on post-conflict operations as well, and recognize that the identified military objectives of the decisive (major combat) operations phase are only interim objectives with respect to the strategic end-state. In a counterterrorist campaign, a more appropriate strategic center of gravity might be the conditions of anarchy and internal strife that permit a transnational terrorist organization to establish a base of operations in a nation-state. In countries such as Sudan or Somalia, these conditions may exist because the central government cannot effectively control all of its territory, or because no central government exists at all. In the specific case of Afghanistan, the anarchy and strife of the early to mid-1990s allowed terrorist elements to flourish, and eventually gave rise to a tyrannical extremist regime that supported, and received support from, al Qaeda. In this light, the operational factors of space and force take on a new dimension. Commanders may not be able to achieve the conditions (leverage) needed during the security and stabilization operations that predominate the post-conflict phase without introducing large concentrations of forces to the theater. This requirement may negate the force multiplier effect that accompanies the U.S.
technological superiority in sensors, weapons, and information management; a multiplier effect that was used so successfully during decisive combat operations in Afghanistan.
The seamless transition to post-conflict operations will also be crucial to capitalizing on the conditions obtained during combat operations. In many cases, the missions that characterize post-conflict operations will be ongoing throughout the combat phase, yet must quickly and decisively come to the fore in the eventual transition. Commanders must ensure this transition is thoroughly planned and precisely synchronized so as to offer immediate security to the nationstate's populace in a restrained and legitimate manner. This is the essence of capitalization whereby the operational commander transforms the favorable conditions established during major combat operations into the leverage needed during post-conflict operations.
The difficulties faced in Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan will be present in future counterterrorist campaigns. 
